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THE POWER OF THE STATES TO TAX INTANGIBLES
By

T

HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER *

HERE have been but few judges who have shared

Tr. Justice
Holmes' doubts' as to the relevance of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the problem of the states' jurisdiction to tax. The doctrine that it imposes important limitations
on the states in that matter is now too firmly established to encourage any hope of its abandonment within any reasonable future period. States will have to continue adapting their tax
policies to its requirements however much publicists may inveigh
against it as an instance of judicial usurpation. There has already
developed a considerable body of law defining the specific meaning of the due process clause in relation to this problem as applied
to a variety of particular fact situations. Recent decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States have, however, raised the
question of how far the earlier decisions may still be accepted by
the states as safe guides by which to steer their tax courses in
dealing with intangible property whether as tax subject or as tax
measure.2 The difficulty confronting the states has arisen from
the frank repudiation by some of those decisions of principles
that had for years passed current as law. The lack of agreement
among the members of the court as to the reasons for the reversal of former specific rules adds to the uncertainty of what,
if any, further changes may be expected. Every attempt to plot
the course of future decisions involves predictions whose probable
accuracy will depend on the extent to which they are based on
the selection and proper weighing of the factors that will affect
those decisions. No rule or system of rules has yet been discov*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Union Ref. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, (1905) 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct.
36, 50 L. Ed. 150.
-See for discussion of the problem of tax subject and tax measure,
Isaacs, The Subject and Measure of Taxation, (1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 939.
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ered for eliminating uncertainty from our predictions. There
are factors which we have reason to believe will affect the result
but of whose influence and method of operation we know so little that our knowledge constitutes an insecure and unsatisfactory
basis for prediction. There are others whose operations have
been More clearly revealed. Our knowledge of the extent and
method of their contribution to the result is neither complete nor
exact, but merely more adequate than with respect to other factors.
It seems preferable, in the present state of our knowledge, to base
our predictions on this latter type. The most important of these
is the effect upon judicial decisions of prior judicial decisions
and theories. However deficient our knowledge of its influence
may be, we still know more about that than about the effects of
judicial social philosophies, and infinitely more than about the
effects of the judges' physical condition when passing on the
case, about which our knowledge is so meager that outside aid
has to be invoked to give plausibility to the theory of its contribution. This does not involve any denial that other factors than
past judicial acting and thinking have a bearing on the problem.
It means only that past judicial decisions, and the reasoning and
theories explicit or implicit in judicial opinions, are the presently
available materials having the greatest predictive value even in
dealing with a problem created by decisions involving judicial refusal to treat those factors as the sole or necessarily most decisive determinants in the process.
The scope of the changes wrought in the law as to a state's
power to subject intangibles to various kinds of taxes by the
series of recent decisions3 depends on their implications which in
turn are closely tied up with their reasoning. They all involved
inheritance taxes imposed by states other than that of the decedent's domicile. The sole basis for the tax in the FarmersLoan
& Trust Co. and Beidler Cases was the domicile of the debtor
within the taxing state, while in the Baldwin Case the claim was
predicated, as to some of the credits, on the presence for safekeeping within the state of the securities representing the credits. 4
3
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, (1930) 280 U. S. 204, 50
Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371; Baldwin v. Missouri, (1930) 281 U. S. 586. 50
Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., (1930)
282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54.
These decisions will frequently be referred to in the subsequent discussion as "the recent decisions" or "the recent cases."
-This statement is not intended to affirm that the arguments used in
the opinions in some of these cases do not suggest other possible bases.
These will be considered in the course of the discussion.
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The Farmers Loan & Trust Co. Case was the first to definitely
and explicitly break with the law as theretofore established in
Blackstone v.Millers which had sustained an inheritance tax by
the state of the debtor's domicile on credits of a non-resident
with respect to whose transfer the decedent's state had imposed
a like tax. Power over the debtor was held to confer jurisdiction
to tax, and the resulting multi-state taxation was held not to violate either the fourteenth amendment or any other federal constitutional provision. A little more than a decade after Blackstone
v.Miller due process was construed to permit a state to levy an
inheritance tax on the transfer of notes owned by a non-resident
but kept within the state for safe-keeping, .even when the debtors
were non-residents of the taxing state and no property within
it was mortgaged to secure the notes.6 The principal reason urged
in support of this conclusion was that the convenience and understanding of business men, which had made of bonds the debt
itself, extended to bills and notes, and that, therefore, the credits
could be deemed to have a situs where their tangible evidences
were kept. There was no doubt but that the state in which credits
had a business situs could impose an inheritance tax on their transfer on that basis alone even as that factor justified it to tax them
by property taxes.7 There were, therefore, four distinct jurisdictions that had a constitutional power to subject the transfer
of credits and bonds to inheritance taxes at the time the court
decided the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. Case. Efforts to reduce
this evil by deducing from the due process clause a prohibition
against inheritance taxation by the state of decedent's domicile
when the bonds were permanently kept for safe-keeping outside
it, based on the theory that such bonds were tangibles within the
protection of the principle of Frick v. Pennsylvania,s were defeated not long before the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. decision.0 It was this "startling possibility" which suggested to the
5(1903) 188 U. S.189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439.
"WVheeler v. Sohmer, (1914) 233 U. S.434, 34 Sup. Ct. 607, 58 L. Ed.
1030.
7

/

New Orleans v. Stempel, (1899) 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110, 44
L. Ed. 174.
8(1925) 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. Ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316.
91Blodgett v. Silberman, (1928) 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410, 72 L. Ed.
749. It was the holding in this case that bonds were intangibles that
caused the supreme court of Minnesota, which had first held the bonds in
the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. case not taxable because they were tangibles
(In re Taylor's Estate, (1928) 175 Minn. 310, 219 N. W. 153), to reverse
its former holding (In re Taylor's Estate, (1928) 175 Minn. 315, 221 N. W.
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Supreme Court that the law on this matter had developed from
an incorrect premise. It is this new premise that must be sought
in the recent decisions.
The reasoning of the prevailing opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota formulates a new premise for at least a certain class of cases. It
commences with an unusually explicit over-ruling of Blackstone
v. Miller so far as that decision lent support to the theory that
different states could tax on diverse and inconsistent theories.
The case was overruled because it had produced friction between
the states and its practical effects had been bad. This, however,
does not yet give a new premise. That is found in that part of
this opinion in which it holds that the general reasons inhibiting
the taxation of tangible personalty by more than one state apply
"under present circumstances equally to intangibles." The reasons assigned are that primitive conditions have passed, that business is now conducted on a national scale, and that a large part
of the national wealth is invested in negotiable securities whose
protection against discriminatory, unjust and oppressive taxation
is a matter of the greatest moment. This is in accord with its
previous statement that the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller is
no longer tenable because of the ill effects of that decision. In
the end the opinion concludes that it finds no sufficient reason for
the position that intangibles are not entitled to immunity from
taxation at more than one place the same as tangibles. The broadest premise deducible from this opinion is that due process prohibits multi-state taxation of intangibles to the same extent that
it prevents multi-state taxation of tangible personalty. The narrowest premise derivable from it is that due process prevents
the state of the debtor's domicile from subjecting the transfer
of bonds to an inheritance tax merely on that basis. That the
premise intended was broader than that last suggested is clear
from the subsequent decisions which have extended immunity
from inheritance taxatioh predicated on the sole basis of power,
over the debtor to bank accounts and ordinary notes, whether or
not secured by property within the taxing state,'" and to ordinary
open accounts. 1 It should be noted that even power of the tax64), only to have their former result affirmed by the federal Supreme Court,
although
on a different theory.
10 Baldwin v. Missouri, (1930) 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed.

1056.
"Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., (1930) 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup.

Ct. 54.
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ing state over the notes did not confer power to impose the tax.
How much broader the premise may be cannot yet be authoritatively determined, but, if its scope is to be defined by reference
to the practical considerations relied on in this opinion, there is
no reason for treating it as anything but a prohibition on all multistate taxation of every type of intangible. There is no indication
liat the discriminatory, unjust and oppressive burden consisted
i anything other than the fact of multi-state taxation of the same
,tansfer under modern conditions as to the distribution of capital
.zid its ownership, which take no account whatever of state lines.
That burden is certainly no less in connection with other kinds
f intangibles, nor in respect to other types of taxes than inheritrce taxes. If the premise that was probably in the minds of
iiose of the justices who accepted this opinion becomes that of
the Court, further sweeping changes in existing law as to a state's
jurisdiction to tax are inevitable.
The problem, however, can not be answered merely on the
basis of the premise implicit in the opinion last considered even
though the last of the decisions in this series (which involved
the power of the debtor's state to place an inheritance tax on the
transfer of an open account) 1 2 was made without the dissents that
marked the two others. The theories advanced in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in the FarmersLoan & Trust
Co. Case and in his dissent in Baldwin v. Missouri, and in the
dissents of Mr. Justice Holmes in both these cases, must also be
considered. It will be convenient to consider first the dissenting
opinions of the latter, concurred in by Mr. Justice Brandeis. The
emphasis in his dissent in the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. Case
was on the fact that the laws of Minnesota were necessary to
the continued existence of the obligation so that its help was
necessary to acquire a right, and that it could demand a quid
pro quo therefor. The affirmative argument in his dissent in
Baldwin v. Missouri was predicated on the protection the assets
in question received from Missouri, although it also contained
a plea not to hedge the taxing powers of the states with restrictions deduced from the due process clause, and repeated the theory
that that clause does not permit the Court to interpose to prevent
multi-state taxation. These last considerations would have more
force if the doubts as to the relevance of the due process clause,
12Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., (1930) 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup.

Ct. 54.
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originally expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Union Ref.
Transit Co. Case," had not been resolved against his view by a
long series of subsequent decisions. Once that had happened,
the issue was no lqnger as to its relevance, but became that of the
extent of the limitations imposed on the states by its vague provisions. At this point the plea for a recognition of the states' interest in a considerable freedom of action in shaping their tax
policies directs attention to a factor that deserves a consideration
that it failed to receive in the prevailing opinions. The position,
however, that Minnesota should have been allowed to tax because
the obligation owed its origin and continued existence to its laws
seems adequately answered by the theory of Mr. Justice Stone
that, once it had passed out of that state, the laws of Minnesota
neither protected it nor could they withhold the power of transfer
or prescribe its terms, and his further position that the fact that
Minnesota law kept the obligation alive constituted too attenuated
a legal relation of that state to the obligation to furnish a reasonable basis for its taxation of the transfer. 1 4 The reference
by Mr. Justice Holmes of Missouri's power to tax to the protection it accorded the securities involved in Baldwin v. M11issouri
has considerable support in the authorities. The prevailing opinion
in the case last cited ignored this factor, but there is no way for
determining whether this is to be taken as an indication that that
factor has become unimportant or means merely that it cannot prevail when another state has a prior claim to tax.
There remain to be considered the views of Mr. Justice Stone.
He agreed with the results reached in Farmers Loan & Trust Co.
v. Minnesota, but reached it by a quite independent line of reasoning. Starting from the premise that a state can impose a privilege tax, such as an inheritance tax, only if the privilege is enjoyed
within it, he held the tax invalid because the transfer of the bonds
was effected in, and controlled by the laws of, the state of the decedent's domicile, strengthening this position by invoking the
principle that it is that law, which, by generally accepted rules, is
applied in the transfer and receives recognition elsewhere. If,
however, the facts are such that an act essential to a completed
transfer must occur .in another state, which ordinarily could be
compelled only within it and in accordance with its laws, then
such non-domiciliary state can impose its inheritance tax on that
13(1905)
199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. Ed. 150.
4
1 See opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, (1930) 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371.
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transfer. It was for this reason, and also because a transfer by
delivery made in Missouri would have defeated the transfer made
in the state of decedent's domicile, that he dissented in Baldwin v.
Missouri. The fact on which Missouri's powers must have been
deemed predicated was the presence of the bank account, bonds
and notes within it, and their ancillary administration therein,
since this factor alone applied to each of the assets involved in
the case. The earlier decision in Wheeler v. Sohnwr is a logical
implication of this theory. It is very doubtful that Mr. Justice
Stone was merely expanding the power argument in the form
that took in Blackstone v. Miller, since he must be deemed to have
rejected that in reaching the result he reached in FarmersLoan &
Triat Co. v. Minnesota. His view rather seems to be that the
payment of a tax in two places on the same economic interest,
with respect to which the owner has sought and secured the benefit of the laws in both, is not so oppressive or arbitrary as to
violate constitutional limitations. The substance of this position is
that a state has the power to tax an economic interest to which it
has accorded protection if its owner has sought its protection with
respect thereto. This correlation of the power to tax with benefits
conferred has considerable authority to support it, but there have
been decisions denying it even as to an economic interest voluntarily within the taxing state. 15 Whether the mere receipt of benefits would justify a tax is not quite clear in view of the reference
to the factor that the owner had sought the benefits derived from
the laws of the taxing state. 16 It may, in any case, be assumed
that the situation in the Baldwin Case constituted one within the
theory expressed by Mr. Justice Stone in his concurring opinion
in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota that a single economic
interest might have such legal relationships with different taxing jurisdictions as to justify its taxation in both. There is no
indication that he intends to raise any question as to the domiciliary state's power. It rather seems that in his view that state
has the power to impose the tax in the case of all intangible per'-See, e. g., Buck v. Beach, (1907) 206 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct. 712, 51
L. Ed.
1106.
'0The securities of a resident of one state might be in another state in
the possession of a thief resident in the latter on the day of the true owner's
death. The latter state would restore the securities to the proper repre-

sentatives of the decedent if proper steps were taken. Does the reference
to the factor that the owner sought the protection result in preventing the
non-domiciliary state from imposing its inheritance tax under these circumstances? And would resort to its courts to recover them involve seeking

its protection so as to permit the tax to be imposed?
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sonalty. His theory at this point is probably not intended to
suggest a principle for restricting the domiciliary state's power,
but rather to announce a basis for defining what other states shall
also be permitted to tax. This seems the view most consistent
with his clear disapproval of the theory that multi-state taxation
alone and under all circumstances amounts to a violation of the
due process clause expressed in his opinions.
The preceding analysis of the Baldwin and Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. Cases has shown several members of the court averse
to treating the due process clause as a complete prohibition of
multi-state taxation of the same legal and economic interest. The
single element common to the views of the several dissenting
justices is the conception that a state that accords an interest benefits and protection should be permitted to tax it irrespective of the
recognized power of another state to also tax it. The question,
therefore, arises whether the rather lukewarm assent of Messrs,
Justices Holmes and Brandeis to the extension of the principles
of these cases by the case of Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Conmission is to be taken as a complete acceptance by them of the
theory that multi-state taxation violates due process or merely
as a recognition that the prior decisions, even when not thus
broadly construed, could not well be denied application to the
credits involved in that case. Further decisions involving inheritance taxes on other intangibles, or other types of taxes on the
same or other intangibles, alone can give the answer; but it seems
reasonably clear from the tenor of their concurring opinion that
further opposition may be expected to extending the theory, which
the majority of the court seems to have accepted, to other intangibles and to other types of taxation. Nor is there any present indication that Mr. Justice Stone has surrendered the position so forcibly and ably presented by him, unless his failure to
express himself in the Beidler Case can be construed so to indicate, which is highly doubtful. The net effect is a condition of
uncertainty as to the exact premise that will furnish the approach
to future problems. Even, however, if the complete prohibition
of multi-state taxation be taken as the premise most likely to be
adopted, there remains the question of when that will be deemed to
be present. There are many situations in which the same single ec onomic interest is treated as supporting a series of legally recognizer
interests therein. The ultimate economic interest supporting the
mortgagor's and mortgagee's legal interest in mortgaged realty
is identical to the extent of the amount of the loan secured by
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the mortgage. Yet it is practically certain that the state in which
the realty is situated would not be violating due process by taxing
the mortgagor on the whole value of the mortgaged premises

while contemporaneously taxing the credit secured by that mortgage.- 7 Due process, therefore, does not require a state to recognize that these different legal interests merely represent a division of shares in a single economic interest, but permits the
double counting of values supported by a single economic interest
in the determination of the total taxable wealth within its jurisdiction.' 8 This duplication of taxable wealth through the recognition of different legal interests in the same ultimate economic
value occurs in an even more exaggerated form .¢henever the
trustee and the cestui are treated as having separate taxable interests in the same assets. Due process does not prohibit a state from
taxing that one of those interests within it even when the other
is beyond its power and taxable elsewhere.' 9 Here the duplication frequently involves doubling the actual economic wealth for
tax purposes, a result not affected by the fact that the different
interests are being taxed by different states. The case of taxing
both the corporate assets and the stockholders' shares evidencing
q distributive economic interest therein, whether by the same or
different states, furnishes another instance of the same kind
against which the federal Constitution interposes no barrier. There
is nothing in the theory applied in the recent decisions heretofore discussed that requires, or even suggests, the conclusion that
these forms of multiple taxation of the same ultimate economic
interest will be held violative of due process. Those decisions
involved the relation of one owner to a given complex of economic
relations constituting a single economic interest. That owner
may stand in more than one legal relation with respect to that
interest under the laws of different states, but these decisions
limit to one state the power to recognize such relation for tax
purposes. The thing aimed at is the taxation by more than one
state of a single economic interest of a given person. The system
of concurrently existing legal or equitable interests in a single
17This is not decided in, but seems to be a fair inference from, Paddell
v. New York, (1908) 211 U. S. 446, 29 Sup. Ct. 139, 53 L. Ed. 275.
IsThere is a limit to this process derived from the due process clause.
It has been held that a state in which their owner held warehouse receipts
covering goods outside the state could not tax the receipts at the value of
the goods covered by them; Selliger v. Kentucky, (1909) 213 U. S. 200,
29 Sup. Ct. 449, 53 L. Ed. 761.
19See Welch v. Boston, (1915) 231 Mass. 155, 109 N. E. 174; Hunt v.
Perry, (1896) 165 Mass. 287, 43 N. E. 103.
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ultimate economic interest may still be recognized by states for
tax purposes despite the resulting multiple taxation of that interest. The thing prohibited is the localizing of the legal interest
representing any given person's distributive share in such a single
economic interest in more than one state. That is the effect of
those decisions even when the prevailing opinions are given their
broadest reasonable and probable interpretation.
The acceptance of the premise that due process prohibits such
multi-state taxation cannot by itself settle the issue as to which
state shall be permitted to impose the tax. That matter has thus
far received but little attention. The decisions in all the cases
under consideration have preferred the claims of the state of the
decedent's domicile. The preference rests on the basis that prior
decisions had determined that "in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile of their owner, ' 20 and that it was there
that the credits passed under decedents' wills.21 It might be said
with respect to the former of these reasons that there were also
prior decisions of the Court that permitted the transfer of credits
to be taxed elsewhere than at their owner's domicile, one of which
it expressly overruled. There was clearly nothing in the prior
decisions sustaining the domiciliary state's power to tax intangibles suggesting that the recognition of its power was intended as
a denial of a like power to all other states. The second of these
reasons states a legal conclusion which does not at all involve the
further conclusion that the credits did not simultaneously pass
elsewhere unless it be assumed either that there exists some general principle of law restricting the passing of property at death
to a single legal transfer or that some constitutional provision
imposes such limitation. There is, of course, but one economic
interest that passes from the former owner to whomsoever succeeds to it, but the issue here is not one of mere fact but of what
legal construction the law has imposed on such fact. There is no
greater inherent legal objection to having two legal transfers imposed on one factual transfer than there is to multiplying taxable
legal interests by imposing more than one legal interest on the
same ultimate economic interest. It is clear, therefore, that this
second reason is valid only if the conclusion it is intended to support is assumed as correct. But, whatever be the dialectic weak20

Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, (1930) 280 U. S. 204, 50
Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371.
21
Baldwin v. Missouri, (1930) 481 U. S.586, 50'Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed.
1056.
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nesses in the reasoning supporting the preference for the domiciliary state, states will be well advised to shape their tax policies
in the light of its existence. The Court has thus far avoided
committing itself on the status of credits having a business situs
in a non-domiciliary state. This matter will be hereinafter more
fully considered.
The decisions thus far have merely determined that a state
cannot impose an inheritance tax on the succession to bonds, registered2 2 or otherwise, notes, bank deposits, and credits evidenced
by open accounts, merely on the basis that the debtor is domiciled within it; that it cannot impose such tax merely because the
bonds or notes "happen to be found" within it when their owner
dies; and that it cannot impose such tax even when the notes tlus
found within it are secured by mortgages on local realty. The
rule of Blackstone v. Miller was expressly overruled. Whether
Wheeler v. Sohmer,23 can still be considered good law depends
upon several things. Even if it be assumed that but one state
is to be permitted to tax the transfer of notes and bonds, still it is
not absolutely certain that the domiciliary state will be the one accorded that power under the circumstances involved in that case.
It is clear that that state will be selected unless another state has
an exceedingly strong claim for a preferred position. The Court
treated the notes and bonds in the Baldwin Case as happening to be
found in Missouri when their Illinois owner died. It is fairly
arguable that that phrase does not cover the situation in which
their owner has placed notes and bonds in another state for permanent safe-keeping where they remain for that purpose until the
date of his death. There would seem to be nothing oppressive
or arbitrary in permitting that state, in which in many cases ancillary administration will be had with respect to those assets, to
impose the tax. The Court has on more than one occasion stated
that fictions will not be allowed to obscure the facts. If that be
taken as the point of departure, the claim of the state in which
the securities were kept would seem to be superior to that of
the domiciliary state whose claim rests on the fiction of "mobilia
22
For state cases involving inheritance taxes on registered state bonds
of the taxing state when owned by non-resident decedents, see Bliss v. Bliss,
(1915) 221 Mass. 201, 109 N. E. 148 (holding transfer taxable); tax
Comm. v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., (1929) 119 Oh. St. 410, 164 N. E.
423 (holding transfer non-taxable). Both cases considered the problem
from point of view of statutory construction only, but some of the reasoning in the Massachusetts Case indicates that the court would have sustained the tax against due process objections.
23(1914) 233 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct. 607, 58 L. Ed. 1030.
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personam sequuntur," unless it be held that the latter state derives a superior claim from the fact that ,inmost cases it carries
the heavier burden connected with the administration of the estate. There is the further consideration that to permit the nondomiciliary state alone to tax in this situation might encourage
evasion of taxes in the domiciliary state through a judicious distribution of securities for safe keeping in neighboring states.
Whether this situation is within the faintly suggested reservation of Mr. Justice McReynolds in the Baldwin Case cannot be
definitely determined.2 Approached from the point of view adopted by Mr. Justice Stone, this situation affords a very good instance of a single economic interest bearing such legal relationships to two states as to permit its transfer to be taxed in both,
but it is unlikely that this view will prevail against the strong
trend adverse to multi-state taxation. The probability, however,
is rather great that the doctrine of Wheeler v. Sohmer can be
deemed discarded, but another decision alone can remove a lingering doubt. The reason for this view is that it seems highly unlikely in fact that the securities involved in the Baldwin Case
merely chanced to be in Missouri when their owner died; it seems
more reasonable (business situs for them having been excluded
by the Court's view of the case) to assume that their owner had
entrusted them to his Missouri agent for safekeeping.
The present status of inheritance taxes on credits having a
business situs in a non-domiciliary state is quite uncertain. The
Court explicitly stated in FarntersLoan & Trust Co. v. MVinnesota
that the record presented no occasion for considering whether
securities taxable by a state under the business situs doctrine
could be taxed a second time at their owner's domicile. It has
not yet resolved this issue since it found that the credits involved
in both the Baldwin and Beidler Cases did not have a business
situs in the taxing state, although Mr. Justice Stone expressed
the opinion that the credits in the Baldwin Case might well have
been found to have had a business situs in Missouri. The language employed by the Court in entering its caveat as to credits
having a business situs rather suggests that the state in which
they have such situs will be preferred to the domiciliary state if
24

The language referred to is the following:
"Normally, as in the present instance, the state of the domicile enforces
its own tax and we need not now consider the possibility of establishing
a situs in another state by one who should undertake to arrange for succession there and thus defeat the collection of the death duties prescribed
at his domici!e."
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it is eventually decided to prohibit their multi-state taxation. This
would seem to be a valid recognition of that state's superior economic claim to treat those credits as a part of the assets employed
in a local business by their owner. There is but little likelihood
that this will promote extensive tax evasions. The question arises
whether the same considerations would not be equally applicable
to a partner's interest in a partnership's business and assets, so
that a deceased partner's interest therein should be localized where
the business is conducted and the assets are employed. That is
the economic fact, however much the legal issues may be complicated by questions as to the legal nature of a partner's interest
in its business and assets. It has, however, been held that where,
under the partnership agreement and under the laws of the state
in which the partnership's assets and business were located, the
partner's interest is a right to receive his share of the partnership's
net value, 25 the partner's share is an intangible having a situs for
tax purposes at his domicile. Hence that state has a constitutional
power to tax the transfer of a resident's interest in a foreign
partnership.20 It will be rather difficult to consider oppressive and
arbitrary an inheritance tax imposed on a non-resident decedent's
share in a partnership imposed by the state in which the partnership business and assets are located. Injustice can be avoided in
the case of a partnership with assets and business in more than
one state by permitting each to tax on that portion of the value
of the interest attributable to the assets and business within it.
There are cases in which a state has been allowed to tax the transfer of a non-resident partner's share in the partnership capital. -7
This state's power to impose the tax should not be made to turn
on legal refinements as to the nature of a partner's interest in the
partnership assets or business, which conceptions have been developed in connection with quite different problems. The natural
desire to employ a single conception in dealing with diverse problems in order to secure a greater consistency in the whole body
of the law affords but a slender basis for denying effect to the
2This theory is in accord with that adopted by the Uniform Partnership Act.
2
3Blodgett v. Silberman, (1928) 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410, 72 L.
Ed. 749. See also Arbuckle's Estate, (1916) 252 Pa. St. 161, 97 Atl. 186 in
which the state in which the partnership business and assets were located
was held not to have taxed the transfer of a non-resident partner's interest;
the constitutional
issue is not considered.
27
See In re Henry, (1922) 203 App. Div. 456, 197 N. Y. S. 63, modified
on another point, (1923) 237 N. Y. 204, 142 N. E. 586; Small's Estate,
(1892) 151 Pa. St. 1, 25 Atl. 23.
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obvious economic fact that the partner's interest is as closely associated with the states in which the partnership carries on its
business as are credits having a business situs with the state in
which they have such situs. If the Court translates it intimation
that the state of the business situs of credits will be preferred
to that of decedent's domicile into actual decision, it will be hard
for it to deny that the state in which a partnership has its business and assets should also be allowed to tax the transfer of the
share of a non-resident partner. This may involve considerable
difficulties and great inconvenience in the case of partnerships
operating in several states, which could be avoided by localizing
the transfer of such share at decedent partner's domicile. Whether
the Court will give such effect to these considerations cannot be
safely predicted. If it should be held that the state in which the
partnership business and assets are located may tax, then multistate taxation will result unless Blodgett v. Silberman follows
Blackstone v. Miller. Furthermore it cannot be definitely determined whether this situation, or the case of credits with a business situs outside the domiciliary state, constitute instances in
which a single economic interest has such legal relationships to
both the non-domiciliary and domiciliary states as to justify taxation by both, but they dre probably within that principle. It is.
patent, in any event, that here is another uncertainty attributable
to these recent decisions.
The prevailing opinion in FarmersLoan & Trust Co. z. Min.nesota refers to the large proportion of our national wealth represented by intangible personalty, and the desirability of protecting it against discriminatory and oppressive taxation. Corporate
shares comprise: a considerable part of such intangible wealth that
would seem to merit protection no less than capital investments
represented by debtors' obligations in their various forms. The
ultimate economic interest evidenced by a corporate share derives
its value from the business and assets of the corporation, and,
therefore, bears a closer economic relation- to the states in which
the assets are situated and the business conducted than it bears
to other states whose claims rest solely on the factors of corporate domicile or the share owner's domicile. It may be inferred
from the decision that due process prevents a state from imposing an inheritance tax on the succession to corporate shares, even
at a value proportionate to the assets within the taxing state,
merely on the basis of the presence of corporate assets or business
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within it, that the economic factor is not the principal legal deterThe legal theory that the property interest represented
minant.2
by the share is a distinct legal interest, including no direct legal
relation of the shareholder to the corporate assets and having a
situs unrelated to that of such assets, prevailed over economic
facts. There have been no decisions by the federal Supreme Court
directly passing on the power of the state in which the stock
certificates are kept for safe-keeping to impose an inheritance tax
on their transfer on that sole basis, but the decision in the Baldwin
Case clearly implies that such tax cannot be imposed merely because such certificates happen to be found within a state at the
time of their non-resident owner's death. An attempt by a state
to impose such tax on the sole basis that the stock was transferred
on the corporate books at a transfer office maintained in the state
by a foreign corporation would almost certainly be held to violate due process, but the Court has not yet passed on that point.
There are, however, decisions of the Court sustaining the power
to impose inheritance taxes on the transfer of corporate shares
by both the state of the corporate and of the decedent owner's
domicile.2 1 It is fairly certain that the multi-state inheritance taxation of this form of intangible wealth will be held violative of
due process unless adequate reasons can be found for distinguishing capital investments evidenced by corporate shares from such
investments evidenced by debtors' obligations. There is no
economic basis for any such distinction. The legal theory on which
the state of the corporate domicile has been permitted to tax the
transfer is that the shares have a situs within it since they represent a distributive share in the capital stock which itself has its
situs within that state, and that that state has the ultimate control
over the transfer of such shares. The fiction of mobilia sequuntur
personam has supplied the legal basis for permitting the state of
decedent's domicile to tax the transfer of corporate shares. These
reasons are certainly no more substantial than those formerly relied on to sustain the power of several states to impose inheritance
taxes on the transfer of credits. Unless, therefore, reasons of
2

8Tyler v. Dane County, (D.C. Wis. 1923) 289 Fed. 843, appeal dismissed, (1924) 266 U. S. 637, 45 Sup. Ct. 10, 69 L. Ed. 481; Shepherd v.
State, (1924) 184 Wis. 88, 197 N. W. 344; Rhode Island Hospital & Trust
Co. v. Doughton, (1926) 270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256, 70 L. Ed. 475, 48
A. L R. 1374.
29
Bullen v. Wisconsin, (1916) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed.
830; Frick v. Pennsylvania, (1925) 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. Ed.
1058, 42 A. L. R. 316.
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policy can be found for distinguishing the cases, the multi-state inheritance taxation of corporate shares will soon be a thing of the
past. There is no doubt but that the case of such shares comes
within the theory of Mr. Justice Stone that would permit multistate taxation in this instance, but nothing as yet warrants a belief
that his theory has gained acceptance among those whose views
will decide the issue. If, however, multi-state inheritance taxation
of corporate shares is to be prohibited, the question of which state
shall be granted the power becomes important. The decision will
lie between the state of the corporate and that of decedent's domicile. The decision in Frick v. Pennsylvania, limiting the latter
state to taxing on a value arrived at by deducting from the value
of the stock the inheritance tax paid with respect to its transfer
to the state of the corporate domicile, clearly rests on the theory
that the claims of the state of the corporate domicile are superior
to those of the state of decedent's domicile. The legal theory underlying this preference is one developed for quite other problenbs
than taxation, and the tax issue should not be settled by reasoning
from it as a premise. It contains elements of fiction as does the
theory employed to justify the state of decedent's domicile to tax
at all. The issue of which of these states should be preferred
should not be settled on such tenuous grounds. It cannot be
settled by invoking the theory that correlates jurisdiction with
protection since both states protect the legal interest represented
by the share in some respects and under some circumstances. The
state of decedent's domicile is that in which ordinarily the decedent's economic position will be most affected by his ownership
of such shares while he is alive. That state also will usually
have protected his person in a degree beyond that secured from
the state of the corporate domicile. It would seem that these
considerations, and the greater convenience of localizing the share
at his domicile, should lead to a reversal of the preference for the
state of the corporate domicile implicit in the decision in Frick v.
Pennsylvania. It must be admitted that reliance upon the argument based on the protection of the decedent while living introduces a factor whose logical consequences might conflict with those
implicit in theories elsewhere employed to justify restrictions on
the domiciliary state's power, but complete consistency of theory
can scarcely be hoped for in dealing with a complex series of
problems whose solution involves many and competing considera-
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tions. The claims of the decedent's domiciliary state are strengthened by the consideration that it will usually be that in which
such assets are certain to be administered whereas administration
in the state of the corporate domicile will be required only to satisfy its taxing statutes. The recent decisions have injected an element of uncertainty into the law of the inheritance taxation of
corporate shares, and made changes in it very probable. "9a
That a state cannot impose an inheritance tax on the transfer
of notes of resident debtors actually administered through its
courts even when the notes are secured by mortgages on lands
situated within it is clear from the decision in the Baldwin Case.
It follows that a state would be prohibited from imposing such tax
on the transfer of such notes if the only basis on which it could rest
the power was that they were secured by mortgages or liens on
local assets. There have been cases in which the fact that credits
owned by non-residents were secured by mortgages on local real
estate constituted a principal reason for holding their transfer taxable."' The theory was largely that that fact gave the credit a situs
within the taxable state because of control over the enforcement
of the claim, rather than that the tax was on the succession to the
mortgage interest in the land which would pass with the transfer
of the credit, although that view seems at least to be suggested.
These cases can no longer be regarded as law so far as they allowed the transfer of the credit to be taxed. 31 The prevailing
opinion in Baldwin v. Missouri, however, explicitly stated that
that case did "not involve the right of a state to tax either the interest which a mortgagee as such may have in lands lying therein,
or the transfer of that interest." Does this reservation of that
issue from the scope of the decision mean anything more than
that that question is still open? Can it be construed as implying
a doubt as to the power of a state to tax the succession to such
interest even though it cannot tax the claim secured by the mortgage? To resolve that doubt in favor of the power to tax will
-OaThe Minnesota supreme court has recently refused to change its
former holdings that the state could impose an inheritance tax on the transfer of a non-resident's stock in a domestic corporation; Estate of Lund
v. Minnesota, (Minn. 1931) 236 N. W. 626.
3OKinney v. Stevens, (1911) 207 Mass. 368, 93 N. E. 586; Auditor
General v. Merriam's Estate, (1907) 147 Mich. 630, 111 L\"W. 196.
31The supreme court of Iowa reversed a former holding to the contrary
s'-ortly after the decision in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
even where the debtor was domiciled within it; see In re Smith's Estate,
(1930) 209 Iowa 685, 228 N. W. 638.
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greatly limit the benefits sought to be achieved by the recent decisions unless the power of the decedent's domicile is concurrently
and correspondingly curtailed. That is quite improbable since
the theory on which the state in which the mortgaged property is
situated will be allowed to tax, if it is allowed to do so, will involve no conflict with the principle localizing the credit at the
decedent's domicile. The result will be that the latter will be permitted to tax the transfer of the credit while the former will be
empowered to tax the concurrent transfer of the creditor's security
interest. The character of that security interest might be either
legal or equitable,3 2 but this should not affect the power to impose the tax of the state in which that interest may be said to
have its situs. If the credit is secured by mortgage on property
in more than one state, the argument would run in favor of all
of them, at least so far as to permit each to tax the transfer on
the basis of an allocated value and, perhaps, on a value equal to
the whole value of the credit up to the value of the security within
the state. The bondholder whose bonds are secured by a deed of
trust has an equitable interest in the security, and under this theory
the succession to his interest could be taxed wherever the property
covered by the trust deed had its situs. This might be partly
avoided by localizing the equitable interest at the trustee's domicile.
The friction and annoyance incident to such a system make those
against which FarmersLoam & Trust Co. v. Minwsota was aimed
seem insignificant. It is quite true that the system would not
involve multi-state taxation of the same legal interest, but it is
unlikely that this would deter the court from invoking due process
to prevent it. It is, therefore, improbable that the statement of
the plain fact that Baldwin v. Missouri did not involve a particular question will ever be held an adequate basis for concluding that
a state will be permitted to tax the succession to the security interest when it cannot tax the transfer of the secured credit.
There are several other decisions involving situations, on which
the federal Supreme Court itself has not yet passed, whose status
is doubtful since it decided the recent cases. The first of these
involves the question of what states can impose inheritance taxes
on the succession to a decedent's beneficial interest in property held
in trust. The state of his domicil can constitutionally impose prop32

For an instance of the latter see Kinney v. Stevens, (1911)
Mass. 368, 93 N. E. 586.

207

POWER OF STATES TO TAX INTANGIBLES

erty taxes on that interest,33 and that state has been allowed to
impose an inheritance tax on its transfer." On the other hand the
state of principal administration of the trust,35 and the state in
which the trust realty had its situs, 6 have taxed the succession to
a non-resident decedent's beneficial interest. None of these cases
specifically discussed a constitutional question, but their arguments
do purport to deal with the jurisdictional problem. There are also
the situations in which an inheritance tax has been imposed on a
resident vendor's interest in a land contract relating to realty in
another state,3" and on a non-resident vendor's interest under a
land contract relating to realty within the taxing state.33 Neither
of these cases explicitly considered the constitutional point. If the
state of vendor's domicile can validly treat his interest as personalty, while that in which the lands are situated can still treat the
land as legally his, the result is multi-state taxation of a kind no
less burdensome than the taxation of the same legal interest by
more than a single state. These problems have not yet been
authoritatively settled, but the recent decisions suggest more than
a possibility that the attempts of different states to impose inheritance taxes on various and inconsistent theories will be further
limited as soon as the federal Supreme Court has occasion to pass
on them. It is further certain that the court will not countenance
the practice of some states to invoke the fiction of equitable conversion to extend their powers to impose inheritance taxes on the
succession to foreign realty of decedents dying domiciled within
them.3"
The formal factor on which a state's power to impose property
or inheritance taxes depends is that the property has its situs
within it. It must be apparent from what has already been said
that the decision that an intangibld has a situs within a certain
state is not the affirmation of a fact but the formulation of a legal
conclusion, 40 and that considerations of reasonable policy are im33
Hunt v. Perry, (1896) 165 Mass. 287, 43 N. E. 103.
34
Dana v. Treas. & Rec. General, (1917) 227 Mass. 562, 116 N. E. 941.
35
Thorne v. State, (1920) 145 Minn. 412, 177 N. W. 638.
Baker v. Comm'r of Corp. & Taxation, (1925) 253 Mass. 130,

38

148 N.
37 E. 593.
State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, (1920) 145 Minn. 155, 176
N. W.
38 493.
in re Roger's Estate, (1907) 149 Mich. 305, 112 N. W. 931.
35

See Land Title & Trust Co. v. Tax Comm., (1924) 131 S. C. 192,
126 S. E. 189, which collects authorities both sustaining and refusing to
apply40this theory.
This is equally true of a judgment that a tangible has a certain
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portant in reaching that conclusion. The preceding discussion has
been wholly concerned with the effect of the recent decisions on the
law as to a state's power to impose inheritance taxes, which alone
were involved in those cases. The questions arise whether the
law as to a state's power to impose property taxes on intangible
personalty is likely to remain unaffected, and what, if any, changes
are likely to occur. That some changes are likely can fairly be deduced from the fact that the evils aimed at by the recent decisions
are at least as great from an annually recurring tax as from an
inheritance tax. The attempt of the debtor's state to tax the
bondholder's property interest was early frustrated by the Supreme
Court4 1l even when the bonds were secured by mortgage on realty
within the taxing state.4 2 The power of the creditor's state to tax
them was early sustained against the contention, among others,
that the tax violated the due process clause. 43 The tax was upheld
on the theory that the situs of the credit was at its owner's domicile.
and that this was not affected by the fact that it was secured by a
mortgage on realty in another state. An attempt to deduce from
the theory that a bond is something more than a mere evidence of
the debt the conclusion that it, and the mortgage securing it, were
tangibles or sufficiently of that nature so as to be within the
principles governing the taxation of tangibles, has been rejected,
even when the bond was that of a non-resident debtor secured by
a mortage on non-local realty and both had always been kept for
4
safekeeping in a state other than that of the owner's domicile.
The theory that due process prevents a state from taxing credits
on the sole basis of the presence within it of the instruments
evidencing the credit, announced in Buck v. Beach,4" is not likely
to be abandoned, and bonds will certainly be held within it if a
situs. It is only the fact that the physical location of a tangible is generally,

but not always, the decisive factor in determining its situs that has tended
to obscure the truth that the judgment as to the situs of tangibles is a legal
construction of fact, not a mere factual judgment.
41State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, (1873) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 300,
21 L. Ed. 179. This case has been cited more frequently than its merits
warrant, especially since the jurisdictional problem has become a matter of
the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It may
still have value if it be assumed that it embodies an interpretation of
fundamental jurisdictional principles in the light of which due process is to
be construed.
42
North Cent. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, (1866) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 262, 19 L. Ed.
88.
43
Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, (1879) 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. Ed. 558.
44
Lockwood v. Blodgett, (1927) 106 Conn. 525, 138 AtI. 520.
4r(1907) 206 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct. 712, 51 L. Ed. 1106.
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case should ever arise. Bonds are already protected against multistate property taxes under earlier decisions, and the recent cases
merely give additional support to that position. This conclusion
applies equally to credits evidenced by notes or mere open accounts.
Neither conclusion applies where the bonds, notes or accounts have
acquired a business situs in a state other than that of their owner's
domicile.
It has been frequently decided that a state other than that of
the owner's domicile can tax credits, whether or not evidenced by
notes, if those credits have acquired what is described as a business
situs within it.46 It is not within the purview of this discussion
to consider what facts will warrant the legal inference that credits
have a business situs within a given state.4 1 It is of importance
that it has been stated that the jurisdiction of the state of the
owner's domicile to impose property taxes on such credits does not
exclude the power of the state of their business situs to impose
like taxes thereon. 4 The question is whether the recent decisions
imply a negative upon the continuation of the multi-state taxation
of such credits. Their treatment for inheritance tax purposes is
still an open question, and the same must be said as to their treatment for purposes of property taxes. The considerations heretofore adduced when discussing the probable decision as to their
liability to inheritance taxes aie relevant in discussing their position for property tax purposes. If the prohibition on multi-state
taxation of a person's legal interest in a single economic interest
is to be carried to its logical conclusions, the existing law as to imposing property taxes on credits having a business situs in a nondomiciliary state will have to be changed. There is no sound economic basis for distinguishing capital invested in a state represented by credits having a business situs within it from direct
investments of capital in seats on exchanges of various kinds. It
has been decided that a state does not deny its residents due
process by imposing property taxes on seats on exchanges located
4oBristol v. Washington County, (1900) 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct.
585, 44 L. Ed. 701; New Orleans v. Stempel, (1899) 175 U. S. 309, 20
Sup. Ct. 110, 44 L. Ed. 174; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, (1907)
205 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499, 51 L. Ed. 853; London & L. & G. Ins. Co.
v. Bd. of Assessors, (1911) 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550, 55 L. Ed. 762.
4T
See Powell, The Business Situs of Credits, (1922) 28 W. Va. L.
Quart. 89.
48
London & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors, (1911) 221 U. S.
346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550, 55 L. Ed. 762.
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without the state,40 and that the state in which the exchange is
located can tax non-residents on their seats on such exchange
without violating due process. 50 These decisions thus expose the
legal interest in a single economic interest to multi-state taxation.
It is difficult to see how both these decisions can stand in the light
of the recent cases unless either the theory of Mr. Justice Stone
be applied, some other theory heretofore invoked to sustain these
taxes be reaffirmed, a new theory be developed, or the position
be adopted limiting the scope of the recent decisions to inheritance
taxes. If the multi-state property taxation of exchange seats is
to be prohibited, the theory urged by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Citizens National Bank v. Durr that the location of the object of
the right is a factor in the jurisdictional problem might well be
employed to limit taxation to the state in which the exchange is
located. The considerations applicable to the problem of exchange seats are equally applicable to the capital interest represented by a partner's share in the partnership business and assets.
Existing decisions also permit property taxes to be imposed on
corporate shares by both the state of the corporate domicile and
that of their owner's domicile."' How far these decisions still
stand must now be deemed an unsettled question. The same
must be said of such taxation of property held in trust and of the
beneficial interest therein. It has been decided that a state cannot
impose a property tax on the trust res, even when this consists of
intangibles, merely because the cestui is domiciled within it,02 or
because of that factor and the fact that it was established by a
resident settlor0 3 It is quite probable from the importance played
by tlhe desire to avoid double taxation in the argument of the prevailing opinion in the case last cited that multi-state property
taxation of intangibles held in trust will not be permitted. The
same case, however, intimates that the principle against multi-state
taxation, as conceived by the Court, will not prevent the taxation
of the trust res by one state and the taxation of the cestui's
40Citizens Nat'l Bk. v. Durr, (1921) 257 U. S. 99, 42 Sup. Ct. 15,
66 L. 0Ed. 149.
5 Rogers v. Hennepin County, (1916) 240 U. S. 184, 36 Sup. Ct. 265,
60 L. Ed. 594.
51Corry v. Baltimore, (1905) 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297, 49 L. Ed.
556; Hawley v. Malden, (1914) 232 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 201, 58 L. Ed.
477; Bellows Falls Power Co. v. Comm., (1915) 222 Mass. 51, 109 N. E. 891.
52Brooke v. Norfolk, (1928) 277 U. S. 27, 48 Sup. Ct. 422, 72 L. Ed. 767.
53Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, (1929) 280 U. S. 83, 50
Sup. Ct. 59, 74 L. Ed. 180.
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equitable interest by another," but that it will permit more than
one state to tax such interest is quite improbable, but still undecided. Further questions that remain open are the taxation of a
resident vendor's interest under a land contract pertaining to
foreign realty and the taxation of the same vendor on his interest
in such land by the state in which the land is situated. It is unlikely that the recent decisions will have any effect upon a state's
power to impose property taxes on the security interest of a nonresident in local realty.
The conduct of a business employing tangibles frequently produces an intangible variously described as good-will, franchise
value, or corporate excess. The state of the corporate domicile
has been allowed to tax the whole of this intangible even where
all the income producing tangibles and business were outside it, and
this was held not to violate due process.55 It has also been decided
in a long line of cases that other states in which the business is
conducted can without violating due process tax a part of that intangible property by the employment of the "unit rule" theory. 6
The particular principles defining the constitutional limits on a
non-domiciliary state's power to determine the amount of such
intangible allocable to it lie outside the scope of the present discussion. The fact of present significance is that, as long as all
these decisions stand, this intangible will be subject to taxation
on its full value in the domiciliary state and to further taxation
in other states on that portion of its value allocable to them. This
will be true even if the rules adopted by all the states involved
for determining its value produce the same value, and those employed by the non-domiciliary states for allocating values to them
result in no duplication of values. There is no doubt but that the
54

The taxation of the cestui's interest by the state of his domicile on
that basis alone has been held not to be unconstitutional, Hunt v. Perry,
(1896) 165 Mass. 287, 43 N. E. 103. See for similar holding where there
were other possible bases on which to support the tax, City of St. Albans
v. Avery, (1921) 95 Vt. 249, 114 Atl. 31, cert. denied, (1921) 257 U. S.
640, 42 Sup. Ct. 51, 66 L. Ed. 411, writ of error dismissed, (1921) 257 U.
S. 666,
42 Sup. Ct. 54, 66 L. Ed. 425.
55
Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, (1920) 253 U. S.
325, 540
Sup. Ct. 558, 64 L. Ed. 931.
6
O
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1891) 141 U. S. 18, 11
Sup. Ct. 876, 35 L. Ed. 613; Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio, (1897) 166 U. S.
185, 17 Sup. Ct. 604, 41 L. Ed. 965; Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, (1877)
166 U. S. 171, 17 Sup. Ct. 527, 41 L. Ed. 960; Fargo v. Hart, (1904) 193
U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct 498, 48 L. Ed. 761; Southern Ry. Co. v.. Kentucky,
(1927) 274 U. S. 76, 47 Sup. Ct. 542, 71 L. Ed. 934. See Isaacs, The
Unit Rule, (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 838.
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logical consequences of the theory that due process prohibits multistate taxation of an owner's legal interest in a single economic interest involve the scrapping of the existing system for taxing this
intangible. It was because of this very fact that the dissenting
opinions in the early cases involving this system argued for localizing of that intangible at the owner's domicile.57 The law has, therefore, been developed in the face of contentions that it would
produce double taxation, but this fact loses practically all its
importance bcause judicial hostility towards the double taxation
of intangibles developed thereafter. If this movement is extended
to this type of intangible, there will arise the very troublesome
problem of which state shall be permitted to tax. The taxpayer's
convenience would be best served by localizing it at the corporate
domicile. That would, however, involve ignoring the economic
claims of the states in which are located the property and business
to which this intangible owes its existence. The result reached
in Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks has but little to recommend it from the point of view of the economic considerations
just referred to. To exclude the power of other states having a
superior economic claim to tax this wealth merely to prefer that
of a statd having no other claim than that the corporation was
chartered by it seems economically unsound, even after allowing
for the consideration that the state may have been selected as that
in which to incorporate in order to secure valuable economic advantages. If it should be decided to prohibit this type of multistate taxation, it may prove necessary to prevent evasions by
correspondingly limiting the power of the states in selecting
measures for excise taxes on the privilege of existing as a corporation or engaging within them in business in corporate form.
It is practically certain that the Court will noV derive from the
premise that due process prohibits multi-state taxation the conclusion that the methods for determining the value and the allocation formulas of the various states that may be permitted to
tax a part of this intangible wealth must be so related that no
duplication of values occurs. The only practicable method for
insuring that result would be to have the identical methods and
formulas in all the states, and to use only factors objectively
determinable so as to avoid possible duplication of values resulting
in the course of administering the laws. This would require judi57See Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio, (1897) 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305,
41 L. Ed. 683.
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cial action that is not likely to be deduced from the due process
clause.

It is, therefore, fairly arguable that the existing law on

this problem shares to some extent in the uncertainty which the
recent decisions have introduced into the problem of the limits
imposed on a state's taxing power by the due process clause.
The preceding discussion has aimed primarily to indicate the
extent to which the recent decisions have disturbed the system of
rules and principles governing a state's jurisdiction to tax that
had been constructed over a long period of years. That law had
been developed in part by applying to tax problems technical
theories and premises that had been evolved for other purposes,
and in part by invoking considerations of policy definitely related
to the tax problem. A clear instance of the former type is that
which supports the power of the state of the corporate domicile
to tax the shares owned by non-residents because the share represents an interest in the capital stock which has its situs in that
state. Factors of policy are present in the theories that correlate
the power to tax with the power to protect the thing taxed or the
person of its owner, and in the arguments supporting the power
of a given state to tax intangibles because they might otherwise
wholly escape taxation. Mr. Justice Stone supports his opposition
to the decision in Baldwin v. Missouri by the argument that it will
tend to facilitate tax evasion. The principal factor in the recent
decisions was the desire to prevent what were conceived to be the
injustices and other bad consequences of the multi-state taxation
of intangibies, an argument whose validity cannot be even discussed without bringing in questions of what constitute sound
tax policies. The dissenting views of Mr. Justice Holmes in the
recent cases acquire a large measure of their force from their
emphasis on the necessity of permitting states considerable leeway
in raising their revenues. The recent cases do not differ from
many that preceded them in invoking considerations of policy as
factors in their decision. They differ only in the relative importance attached to factors of policy as compared with other
factors, and in giving what appears to be decisive importance in
dealing with the taxation of intangibles to a policy whose relevance
in that connection had theretofore been denied. The economic
effects of a state's tax policy upon the maintenance of a free
capital market within the whole of the United States has thus
become a crucial element in determining the validity of its fiscal
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program under the due process clause. There is no reason why
this should not be considered if other factors of policy are to be
taken into account, and experience has shown that it is practically
impossible to exclude them in applying the test of reasonableness
that determines the validity of state action when due process is
invoked to defeat it. It would seem to be much more pertinent
to that issue than some of the technical legal arguments employed
in dealing with this jurisdictional problem. It would, however,
be a mistake to treat it as always the decisive factor. The solution must take account of the necessity for giving states leeway
in framing their tax policies not merely in order that they may
secure adequate revenues but also in order that their powers to
distribute the burden fairly be not too severely limited by subtracting from their power elements entering into the wealth of
their residents. Even here it seems desirable to substitute for
technical legal theories factors of economic significance. It may
prove practically undesirable to localize the taxation of wealth or
its transfer in those states in which the economic factors are
present that give that wealth its value, and it may also be practically impossible to determine where it shall be locafized on that
theory. There is, however, no reason for ignoring this factor in
determining the reasonableness of a state's taxing policy and
thereby its validity. The recent decisions have the merit of frankly
injecting economic considerations into the solution of these constitutional problems. They have opened the way to a re-examination
of our former solutions to some of them on the basis of more
fundamental considerations than some that have in the past been
employed in reaching those solutions. A period of uncertainty
as to how much of the former law on these jurisdictional problems
remains unimpaired may ultimately prove a price worth paying for
this opportunity to re-examine, and perhaps re-define, the premises
for our thinking about these problems. s
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